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International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to
a Supranational Code?
–Jane C. Ginsburg*

Introduction
In Federalist No. 43, James Madison, justifying the new U.S.
Constitution’s patent-copyright clause, declared, “The States cannot separately
make effectual provision” for the protection of the exclusive rights of authors.1
Territorial regimes limited by state borders could not ensure effective protection
for works whose distribution inevitably (and designedly) crossed state lines.2 For
that reason, Congress required the authority to “secur[e] for limited Times to
Authors the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings,”3 lest the interstate movement of
works of authorship deprive authors of effective coverage.4
Today, in an era of instantaneous transnational communication of
copyrighted works, the same concerns that faced the Framers of the Constitution
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1

A. HAMILTON, J. JAY, J. M ADISON, T HE FEDERALIST, No. 43, 279 (Modern Lib. ed.).

2

During the period of the Articles of Confederation, the separate States were urged
to pass copyright laws; all but Delaware did. See, "Resolution passed by the Colonial
Congress, recommending the several States to secure to the authors or publishers of new
books the copyright of such books," May 2, 1783, reprinted in T HORVALD SOLBERG, ED .
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 11, 29 (1906). These piecemeal measures,
however, proved inadequate, at least for entrepreneurial authors, like Noah Webster, who
sought a nationwide audience. See, N OAH W EBSTER, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the
United States, in A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY AND M ORAL SUBJECTS 17378 (New York 1843) (Burt Franklin reprint 1968).
3

U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8..
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After ratification of the Constitution, but before the new U.S. Congress enacted the
first copyright law in 1790, authors sought nationwide coverage, by petitioning Congress for
special protections. See, Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating
to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT . OFF . SOC . 243 (1940) (reproducing the text
of the petitions).

of the United States in 1789 have surfaced in the international context. There is
reason to doubt that the nation states that comprise the Berne Union, the World
Trade Organization, and beyond can “separately make effectual provision” for the
protection of authors’ rights. Yet “international copyright,” in the sense of a
uniform law binding all nation states, does not exist.5 Rather, at present we have
a system of interlocking national copyrights, woven together by the principle of
national treatment. While the Berne Convention has imposed a minimum
standard as to subject matter and rights protected, this multilateral overlay cannot
conceal the traditional image of international copyright as essentially a bundle of
national, territorially defined, rights.6
But this traditional image may be increasingly misleading. In recent years,
the number and content of substantive norms that multilateral instruments impose
on member states have increased considerably. This is, therefore, a good time to
consider the extent to which those instruments have created an international (or at
least multinational) copyright code, as well as to inquire what role national
copyright laws do and should have in an era not only of international copyright
norms, but of international dissemination of copyrighted works. In this Article, I
first consider the displacement of national norms through the evolution of a de
facto international copyright code, elaborated in multilateral instruments such as
the Berne Convention, the TRIPs Accord, and the pending WIPO Copyright
Treaty, as well as by harmonization measures within the European Union. In the
second part of this Article, I address the place that remains for national copyright
norms, first through gaps left in the WIPO, WTO and EU multilateral instruments,
and second, through choice of law. In the latter instance, a national norm will
govern a multinational copyright contract or dispute, but other national copyright
norms may be eluded.
Finally, in an era of international trade and norms, I consider what role
should remain for national copyright laws. National copyright laws are a
component of local cultural and information policies. As such, they express each
sovereign nation’s twin aspirations for its citizens: exposure to works of

5

See, e.g., Copyright Office Home Page, <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/fls/fl100.pdf>
(visited Oct. 1, 1999) (“There is no such thing as ‘international copyright’ that will
automatically protect an author’s writings throughout the world.”).
6

See, e.g., Jon Baumgarten, Primer on the Principles of International Copyright, in
FOURTH A NNUAL U.S. COPYR I G H T OFFICE SPEAKS : CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 470, 471 (1992) (Prentice-Hall Law & Business): "The term
`international copyright' is something of a misnomer, for neither a single code governing
copyright protection across national borders, nor a unitary multi-national property right, exists.
What does exist is a complex of copyright relations among sovereign states, each having its
own copryight law applicable to acts within its territory." (emphasis in original)
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authorship, and participation in their country’s cultural patrimony. Perhaps that
simply means that each country’s local policies should prevail within its borders,
whatever the national origin of the work locally received. On the other hand, the
pervasive international dissemination of works of authorship also calls into
question the extent to which authors and their works should be subject to
different national standards. I conclude that national laws allocating copyright
ownership form the strongest candidates for preservation; national exceptions to
copyright present a more difficult, but potentially persuasive, case for persistence
of national norms as well.
I. Toward an international copyright code
A. Berne Convention, the TRIPs Accord, and the Pending WIPO
Copyright Treaty
1. The genesis of the Berne Convention: roots of the debate
between supranational norms and national treatment
From the outset of the movement for international copyright protection,
two distinct principles have vied for primacy. On the one hand, the non
discrimination principle of national treatment preserves the integrity of domestic
legislation, but ensures that foreign authors will be assimilated to local authors.
On the other hand, supranational norms guarantee international uniformity and
predictability, and thus enhance the international dissemination of works of
authorship. A compromise approach institutes national treatment, but avoids
local underprotection by imposing minimum substantive standards that member
countries must adopt. The development of the Berne Convention illustrates all
three of these approaches.
In 1858, the first international Congress of Authors and Artists met in
Brussels.7 The resolutions the Congress passed laid the groundwork for the
writing and drafting of the Berne Convention. The Congress’ resolutions urged
elimination of formalities, national treatment, and uniform national legislation.8

7

See S. STEWART , INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 41 (1983).

8

See S. LADAS , T HE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY
72 (1938). The Congress of Authors and Artists met three times (1858, 1861, and 1877) and
each time adopted resolutions asking governments to join together in passing legislation for
the international protection of authors. The resolutions they passed in 1858 were:
That the principle of international recognition of copyright in favor of authors must
be made part of the legislation of all civilized countries.
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Thus, from the outset, national norms were to work in tandem with international
norms, but the latter were to be implemented through uniform domestic
legislation.
At the first intergovernmental meeting in 1883 to form the Berne Union,
however, the emphasis initially shifted away from the non-discrimination principle
of national treatment, and toward international uniformity. The German
delegation, in a diplomatic questionnaire, asked whether it might be better to
abandon the national treatment principle in favor of a treaty that would codify the
international law of copyright and establish a uniform law among all contracting
states. Although most participating countries viewed the proposition as a
desirable one, they voted against it because it would have required great
modifications of their domestic laws, which many countries could not implement
all at once. Thus, rejecting a treaty that would institute a uniform law of
international copyright, the fourteen participating nations chose to retain the
national treatment approach.
The German proposition was nevertheless critical in that it revealed the
differing copyright philosophies of the participants: while one group favored a
codified and uniform law of international copyright, another preferred as little
unification and as much national independence as possible.9 These differing

This principle must be admitted regardless of reciprocity.
The assimilation of foreign to national authors [national treatment] must be
absolute and complete.
Foreign authors should not be required to comply with any particular formalities
for the recognition and protection of their rights, provided they have complied
with the formalities required in the country where publication first took place.
It is desirable that all countries adopt uniform legislation for the protection of
literary and artistic works.
Id. See also SAM RICKETSON, T HE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS : 1886-1986 42-43 (1987) [HEREINAFTER RICKETSON].
9

Professor Sam Ricketson divides the differences in ideology into two groups: the
universalist, and the pragmatic view. While the universalists wished for a uniform law of
copyright to be adopted either through a multilateral convention or through each country’s
adoption of uniform, general laws applicable to both nationals and foreigners alike, the
pragmatists criticized them as unrealistic and utopian. The pragmatists argued that true
universality would be impossible in the absence of agreement on the fundamental nature of
authors = rights (whether grounded in moral or economic rights). The pragmatists thus focused
on the need for compromise and advocated the adoption of a minimal universality to which the
largest number possible could adhere. Ricketson underscores that the tension between these
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philosophical positions became manifest in the ensuing discussions of the
substantive provisions of the Berne Convention. For example, countries that
favored a universal law argued that the Convention should protect all authors who
published in a Union state regardless of nationality.10
When the 1884 Conference began, an eighteen article draft
awaited the participants. The draft contained all of the basic principles adopted at
the 1883 conference: national treatment, abolition of formalities as a prerequisite
for copyright protection, recognition during the entire term of the copyright of the
author’s exclusive right to authorize translations of her work, and the
establishment of an International Bureau of the Union.11 However, in light of the
differing philosophies of international copyright protection, the 1884 draft was
changed to protect only authors who were nationals of Union countries and
publishers of works published in the Union. In general, in comparison to the
universalist draft adopted at the 1883 Conference, the final draft of 1884 moved
away from the idea of a comprehensive uniform international law of copyright.12
The draft introduced by the 1885 Conference was even less protective
and less universal in scope than the 1884 version. The participants declined to
adopt universally binding legislation, and instead to left to the individual countries
decisions as to the nature and the scope of copyright protection for foreign
authors.13 The underlying rationale was that a flexible international treaty would
permit more countries to accede to the Union, thus increasing membership.14 The

conflicting viewpoints strongly influenced the initial and subsequent development of the
Berne Convention. The universalists have been responsible for the steady increase in
measures to such an extent that the Berne Convention is sometimes viewed as an international
code of copyright. On the other hand, the Amodifying influence@ of the pragmatists has
ensured that these changes enjoyed the widest possible support; as a result, these measures
often emerged in somewhat diluted form. See id. at 39-41.
10

The universalist countries generally included France, Switzerland and Belgium. See
BERNE CONVENTION 90-92 (WIPO ed. 1986) (recording comments and pos i t i o n s o f t h e s e
countries).
11

See id. at 83-86.

12

For example, the participants granted each contracting state the right to establish
conditions under which works could be freely reproduced in certain types of publications (ie
scientific ones) and recognized the translation right for ten years only. See LADAS , supra note
8, at 79.
13

See Records of the Second International Conference for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works in BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 108.
14

See LADAS , supra note 8, at 80-81.
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adoption of a comprehensive and universal copyright law was thus sacrificed for a
narrower body of rules accepted by a wide array of countries.
In order to further this goal of greater adherence, a number of provisions
were amended and replaced by references to national law for provisions that
previously constituted the beginning of a uniform codification of international
copyright law.15 This draft was then ratified and signed at the 1886 Conference.
Although the Convention did not achieve every goal outlined at the first Congress
of 1858, it represented a major step towards international copyright protection.
More significantly, despite the diverging philosophies of the participating
countries, the 1886 Berne text lay the groundwork for later evolution toward the
more universalist ideal expressed in earlier drafts.
2. The 1886 Berne Convention and its successors: the growth of
supranational norms
The basic structure of the Berne Convention has remained relatively
unchanged throughout each of its revisions. It contains substantive minimum
standards of protection, as well as a general directive to accord Unionist authors
national treatment. Each subsequent revision of the Berne Convention, from
1896 through 1971, as well as the 1994 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property [TRIPs] accord,16 and the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty [WCT],17
however, have adopted more substantive minimum standards to which Union
members must adhere, while retaining a key “pragmatic” feature: the Berne
minima apply to a Union member’s protection of works from other Berne
members; no Berne member is obliged to accord its own authors treaty-level
protection. 18 Thus domestic norms may continue to apply to purely domestic

15

Among the amended provisions were those concernin g translation rights,
adaptations, the right of presentation of dramatic and dramatico-musical works, the protection
of photographs and choreographic works, and the reproduction of articles in chrestomathies
and in selections intended for instruction and the reproduction of articles of newspapers and
periodicals. See LADAS , supra note 8, at 81.
16

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instrument — Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 321,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
17

WIPO Copyright Treaty, CRNR/DC/94 (adopted by the Conference, December 20,

1996).
18

See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971
text)1161 U.N.T.S. 3 arts. 5.1, 5.3 [hereinafter Berne Conv.].
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copyright controversies, although, as a practical matter, local legislators may have
difficulty justifying better treatment of foreign than domestic authors.19
The original Berne Convention provided an explicit, but not exclusive, list
of works to be protected.20 The Berne Convention also defined the conditions for
protection, known as points of attachment, and also specified rules governing the
term of protection. 21 Subsequent conferences have amended each of these
provisions in order to increase the scope of authors’ rights. Among the minimum
standards that all member countries were required to recognize, the original Berne
Convention first established the translation right;22 more exclusive rights, as well
as some optional exceptions, were added over the course of subsequent
revisions.23
The actual impact of the Berne Convention on national norms also
depends on whether or not the member State treats the Convention as selfexecuting. If it does not, but instead executes its treaty obligations by
implementing the substantive dispositions through its national law, there is a risk

19

But see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A (restoring copyright in non-U.S. Berne and WTO
works whose copyrights expired due to failure to comply with U.S. formalities).
20

See Berne Conv. (1886 text), art. 4 in BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 10.

21

See id., arts. 2 & 3.

22

See id., art. 5.

23

For example the exclusive recording right of musical works and the right of authors
to authorize the reproduction and public performance of their work by means of a
cinematograph were introduced by the Berlin Revision of 1908 (art. 13 and art. 14), the moral
right to claim paternity of a work and the right to “object to any deformation, mutilation or
other modification” of the work as well as the broadcasting right were introduced at the Rome
Revision Conference of 1928 (arts. 6bis and 11bis), and the droit de suite was added at the
Brussels Revision of 1948 (art. 14bis para. 1). The 1971 revision set forth the reproduction
right, but also posed general terms under which member states could provide for exceptions
to that right (arts. 9.1, 9.2) See BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 10.
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that the national legislation will not fully conform to the Berne Convention’s text.24
The adoption by members of the World Trade Organization of the TRIPs
accord further extended the Berne Convention minimum standards to countries
beyond the Berne Union who are members of the World Trade Organization. 25
The TRIPs accord also imposed new substantive minima, both with respect to
subject matter (computer programs and original compilations of data),26 and to
rights protected (rental right).27 TRIPs also generalizes the conditions for
limitations and exceptions to protection.28 In a significant enhancement to the
Berne Convention’s substantive minima, the TRIPs accord contains detailed
provisions on enforcement of copyright.29 Thus, while the TRIPs continues to
leave to national legislation many details of copyright scope and enforcement, the
outline of uniform mandatory measures has become increasingly explicit. The
place of national policy thus shrinks accordingly.
Finally, the 1996 WCT, now open for ratification, not only continues the
trend of increased specification of the minimum international content of copyright
subject matter and rights, but creates new obligations to protect against the
circumvention of technological protection measures, and against the removal or
tampering with copyright management information.30 While member states may

24

For example, in 1989, when the U.S. adhered to the Berne Convention, it did not
amend the 1976 Copyright Act to provide for the rights of attribution and integrity guaranteed
by Berne Conv. Art. 6bis. Congress took the position that these rights already existed in the
Copyright Act, or in other dispositions in the trademarks law or at common law. See H.R. Rep
No. 609, 100 th Cong., 2d sess. at 37 (stressing that then-Director-General of WIPO Arpad
Bogsch endorsed the U.S. view that its pre-Berne adherence positive law satisfied art. 6bis).
This assertion has prompted considerable skepticism, see, e.g., Adolf Dietz, The United States
and Moral Rights: Idiosyncracy or Approximation? Observations on a Problematical
Relationship Underlying United States Adherence to the Berne Convention, 142 RIDA 222
(Oct. 1989).
25

TRIPs does not, however, incorporate article 6bis of the Berne Convention (moral
rights). See TRIPs art. 9.1.
26

Id. art. 10.

27

Id. art. 11.

28

Id. art. 13.

29

Compare TRIPs arts. 41 - 61 with Berne Convention art. 16.

30

WCT arts. 11, 12.
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implement these new obligations in different ways, the terms of the new provisions
may not leave substantial room for differing interpretations.31
B. Harmonization measures within the European Union
Beginning in 1991, the European Commission issued five Directives
concerning copyright and neighboring rights32; another is currently pending33.
Designed to lift impediments to the free movement of goods and services within
the European Union, and to relieve the uncertainty caused by disparities in
national laws,34 the Directives target subject matter or rights that member states
have treated differently, for example, by imposing divergent standards of
originality (computer programs; databases), or inconsistent levels of protection
(duration, rental rights, cable and satellite retransmission). Significantly, unlike the
Berne Convention and related multilateral accords, whose minimum standards

31

With the following important exception: art. 11 requires member states to protect
against “the circumvention” of technological measures; it is not completely clear whether this
text requires prohibition not only of direct acts of circumvention, but also of the manufacture
and dissemination of circumvention devices. The U.S. and the E.U. have interpreted art. 11 in
the latter sense. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b); Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
Information Society (COM 1999 250 final 97/0359/COD) (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter Information
Society Draft Directive], art. 6.2.
32

Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs,
91/250/EEC, O.J.E.C. L 122 [hereinafter Software Directive]; Council Directive of 19 November
1992 on the rental and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of
intellectual property, 92/100/EEC, O.J.E.C. L. 346 [hereinafter Rental Right Directive]; Council
Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993, on the coordination of certain rules concerning
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable
retransmissions, O.J.E.C. L. 248/15 [hereinafter Cable and Satellite Directive]; Council Directive
93/98/EEC of 20 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain
related rights, O.J.E.C. L. 290/9 [hereinafter Duration Directive]; Directive 96/9/EC of the
European parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases,
O.J.E.C. L. 77/20 [hereinafter Database Directive].
A “Directive” sets forth substantive rules that European Union Member States must
transpose into their domestic laws. Member States need not incorporate the text of Directives
verbatim (although they may), so long as the domestic law implements the substance. See
generally, P.J.G.KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN T HEMAAT , INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 193-97 (2d ed. 1989, Laurence W. Gormley, ed.).
33

Information Society Draft Directive, supra note 31.

34

See arts. 30. 336, 57(2), 100(a) of the EC Treaty (now arts. 28, 30, 47(2), 95 EC), 1997
O.J.E.C. (C340) 173.
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apply only to member states’ treatment of foreign works35, the Directives require
harmonization of E.U. members’ substantive norms as a matter of internal
domestic law, as well as a matter of treatment of foreigners.
The Directives do not purport to regulate all of copyright. Rather,
pursuant to the rule of “subsidiarity,”36 the Directives claim to address only those
areas of copyright law in which national disparities threaten the smooth functioning
of the internal market. As we shall see, however, particularly taking into account
the pending Information Society Directive, the Directives in fact address many, if
not most, issues in copyright law.
First, with respect to the subject matter of copyright, the Directives
advertise only their coverage of software and databases, bringing them into the
subject matter of copyright, and subjecting them to a uniform standard of
originality: the work must be the “author’s own intellectual creation.”37 But the
Duration Directive, albeit a text concerning the regime of rights, also includes a
subject matter provision: it imposes the same standard of originality on
photographs, and further stresses that photographs are thereby brought within a
uniform copyright fold, by cautioning: “No other criteria shall be applied to
determine their eligibility for protection.”38 One might predict that the European
Union-wide “author’s own intellectual creation” standard of originality will
eventually replace divergent national norms, such as the lower U.K. “skill and
labour,”39 or the higher French “imprint of the author’s personality,”40
thresholds.41
35

See discussion supra , text at and note 18.

36

See art. 3(b) of the Treaty on European Union (now art. 5 EC) 1997 O.J.E.C. (C340)
145. On subsidiarity, see generally, George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:
Federalism in the European Community and in the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331
(1994); George Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT . &
COMP. L. REV. 97 (1993).
37

Software Directive, art. 1.3; Database Directive, art. 3.1.

38

Duration Directive, art. 6. The same cautionary note appeared in the Software
Directive, art. 1.3, and the Database Directive, art. 3.1.
39

See, e.g., W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 334-35 [¶ 10-18] (3d ed. 1996).

40

See, e . g . A NDRÉ LUCAS & HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS , PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET
A RTISTIQUE ¶¶ 80-86. See also W.R. CORNISH, supra note 39 at ¶¶ 10-09 - 10-10, comparing
British, “authors rights” countries, and EU concepts of originality.
41

Cf. Gerhard Schricker, Farewell to the “Level of Creativity” (Schopfungshohe) in
German Copyright Law, 26 I.I.C. 41, 46 (1995) (suggesting that EU standard preludes
application of higher German “level of creativity” standard “for a growing numbers of types
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Second, with respect to copyright ownership, the Directives do not
harmonize all ownership rules, but they do pose some significant uniform norms,
for example, employer-ownership of computer programs 42, and authorentitlement to equitable remuneration for exploitation of the rental right in films or
phonograms.43 Nonetheless, as we shall see in Part II, the Directives do not
harmonize ownership rules as intensively as they might.
Third, with respect to the regime of protection, the combination of the
first five Directives and the pending Information Society Directive covers almost
all of the rights and exceptions and limitations on copyright. Where the first five
Directives detailed “restricted acts” and “exceptions to restricted acts” with
respect to particular subject matter (software, databases) or rights (rental,
lending, transmissions by cable and satellite), the Information Society Directive is
based on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, and thus synthesizes most of the
rights under copyright. The Directive therefore articulates a very broad scope for
the reproduction right, specifically including temporary reproductions, in any
manner or form.44 The Directive also phrases the right of communication to the
public in very broad terms, notably obliging member states to include making the
work available to the public “in such a manner that members of the public may
access the work from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”45 As a
result, the Directive requires member states to cover an extremely wide range of
public performances and public displays of works of authorship, including all
forms of transmissions, whether or not made by wire. The Directive also
mandates a right of distribution of physical copies of works of authorship, and
specifies that the right is not exhausted unless copies have been sold within the
E.U. by or under the authority of the rightholder.46 The Directive also implements
the WCT’s provisions on technological protections and copyright management
information. It therefore requires member States to prohibit both the
circumvention (direct or by means of dissemination of circumvention devices) of

of work”).
42

Software Directive, art. 2.3.

43

Rental Right Directive, art. 4.1.

44

Draft Information Society Directive, art. 2.

45

Id. art. 3.1. The language comes from the WCT, art. 8.

46

Draft Information Society Directive, art. 4.
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technological protection measures, and the removal or distortion of copyright
management information.47
Equally, if not more importantly, in enumerating the limitations and
exceptions to copyright for which member states may provide, the Information
Society Directive appears to preclude Member States from introducing further
exceptions or limitations. The Directive states, “Member States may provide for
limitations to the exclusive right of reproduction provided for in Article 2 in the
following cases: . . .” and “Member States may provide for limitations to the
rights referred to in Articles 2 [reproduction] and 3 [communication to the public]
in the following cases: . . .”48 This suggests that, outside the listed cases, Member
States may not provide for additional exceptions or limitations. Moreover, the
proposed Directive, as amended by the European Parliament and revised by the
Commission, further requires Member States to provide “equitable
compensation” for many of the permitted acts, such as private copying (analog
and digital), photocopying, and certain educational and research reproductions or
transmissions.49 Finally, even with respect to the listed cases, the Directive
imposes the Berne Convention’s “three step test:”50 the exceptions and limitations
must be restricted to “certain specific cases, and may not be interpreted in such a
way as to allow their application to be used in a manner which unreasonably
prejudices the rightholders’ legitimate interests or conflicts with a normal
exploitation of their subject matter.”51
There is another class of exceptions for which the Directives mandate
even greater intra-Union uniformity. Unlike the exceptions reviewed above,
which member States may, but need not, implement, the Directives require
member States to provide for certain exceptions to or limitations on copyright.
These EU-imposed restrictions on the scope of copyright concern the rights of
lawful acquirers of copies to make backup copies of computer programs, to
access the content of computer programs and databases,52 and to decompile

47

Id. arts. 6, 7.

48

Id. arts. 5.2, 5.3

49

Id. arts. 5.2(a)(b)(b bis), 5.3(a).

50

See Berne Conv. Art. 9.2. See Mihály Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The
WIPO “Internet” Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & THE A RTS 197, 214-15 (1997).
51

Draft Directive, art. 5.4; the language paraphrases Berne Convention art. 9.2 and
WCT art. 10.
52

Software Directive, art. 5; Database Directive, art. 6.1; see also id., art. 8.1 (exception
to sui generis right).
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computer programs under certain circumstances.53 The Draft Information Society
Directive introduces an exemption from liability for “temporary reproductions
which are an integral part of a technological process for the sole purpose of
enabling use to be made of a work . . .” whether or not the initial communication
of the work was lawfully made.54
The Directives thus set an overall, often quite detailed, framework guiding
national legislators, considerably limiting the opportunities for national variance
regarding the scope of copyright protection. I would further suggest that the
uniform originality standard adopted in the Directives will come to constrain the
freedom of national legislatures to vary the subject matter of copyright. In the
case of copyright ownership, by contrast, the Directives do allow Member States
a considerably freer hand to allocate rights among authors, employers, and
transferees.

II. What place remains for national copyright norms?
Given the substantial muting of national norms by multilateral instruments,
it is now appropriate to inquire what place remains for national copyright norms.
A. Gaps left in the WIPO, WTO, and EU Multilateral Instruments
1. Berne Convention, TRIPs, and WCT
While the multilateral treaties are increasingly comprehensive with respect
to the subject matter and scope of copyright, significant gaps remain, particularly
with respect to authorship and ownership of copyright. Indeed, apart from the
Berne Convention’s much-criticized art. 14bis.2,55 concerning ownership of rights
in cinematographic works, none of the three principal treaties contain detailed

53

Software Directive, art. 6.1.

54

Information Society Directive, art. 5.1. The European Parliament amended this
provision to require that the communication have been lawfully made (amendments 16 and 33),
but the Commission rejected the amendment. See Amended P r o p o s a l , supra note 31,
Explanatory Memorandum, 4.1.
55

See, e.g., HENRI DESBOIS , A NDRÉ FRANÇON, A NDRÉ KÉRÉVER, LES CONVENTIONS
INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT D’A UTEUR ET DES DROITS VOISINS 216-21 (1976); RICKETSON, supra
note 8, at 589.
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provisions on copyright ownership.56 The Berne Convention does, however,
announce that authors are “entitled to institute infringement proceedings in the
countries of the Union,” and that authorship status shall be presumed if the
author’s name “appear[s] on the work in the usual manner.”57 If authors may
enforce copyright, it follows that they are, at least initially, the owners of the rights
they seek to enforce. On the other hand, the Berne Convention does not require
that the actual creator’s name appear on the work in the usual manner. As a
result, its coverage of “authorship” and ownership is only partial. The TRIPs and
the WCT do not supply further guidance.
With respect to the subject matter of copyright, the Berne Convention
does not articulate a standard of originality, and thus may leave open the
possibility of national variation.58 TRIPs and the WCT, however, have closed
that gap, at least in part, by imposing an “intellectual creation” standard for
computer software and databases;59 as with the E.U.’s “author’s own intellectual
creation” standard, this threshold for originality may be generalized across
copyrighted works.60 The TRIPs and WCT also specify that “Copyright
protection extends to expressions, and not to ideas, procedures, methods of
operation or mathematical concepts as such,”61 but do not define the excluded
elements. As domestic caselaw, at least in the U.S., reveals, courts may differ as
to what constitutes an “idea” or “method of operation.”62 Perhaps countries party
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B u t s e e Sam Ricketson, People or Machines? The Berne Convention and the
Changing Concept of Authorship, 16 Colum.-VLA J. L. & the Arts 1 (1991) (contending that
the Berne Convention implicitly designates the human creator, rather than juridical persons,
as the author and initial copyright owner).
57

Berne Conv., art. 15.1.

58

See Jane C. Ginsburg, Surveying the Borders of Copyright, 41J. Copyr. Soc. 322,

327 (1994).
59

TRIPs, art. 10; WCT, art. 5 (databases).

60

See discussion supra , text at notes 36-39. Query whether the EU’s “ author’s own
intellectual creation” standard (emphasis supplied) is higher than the TRIPs-WCT “intellectual
creation” standard.
61

TRIPs, art. 9.2; WCT art. 2.

62

Compare Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d. by an equally divided
Court, 116 S.Ct. 804 (1996) (spreadsheet program’s menu commands held a “method of
operation”) with American Dental Association v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n., 126 F.3d 977 (7th
Cir. 1997)(“taxonomy,” system of classifying dental procedures, held not a “method of
operation”).
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to the TRIPs and/or WCT will so diverge as well, leaving open the possibility that
the same work may be copyrightable in one country, but not another.
With respect to the scope of rights and of exceptions, the 1971 Berne
Convention text tended to address specific issues, rather than synthesizing rights
and exceptions. The TRIPs and WCT, however, have undertaken the synthesis,
and thus have largely filled gaps left by the Berne Convention’s rather more
pointillist approach.63 Two significant gaps nonetheless remain. First, although
art. 6bis of the Berne Convention requires Union members to protect authors’
rights of attribution and of integrity, the TRIPs explicitly excludes art. 6bis from its
incorporation of Berne Convention norms.64 As a practical matter, this leaves a
gap because failure to implement unincorporated Berne Convention norms carries
no meaningful sanction, while non compliance with TRIPs obligations can lead to
trade sanctions against the recalcitrant country. 65 Second, while the Berne
Convention does not specify a right to distribute copies, both the TRIPs and
WCT do; both treaties, however, explicitly leave it to member countries to
determine under what circumstances, if any, that right will be deemed
exhausted.66
Finally, it is important to note that the rights concerned are minimum
rights: signatory countries may provide for greater rights than those required, so
long as they accord national treatment.67 Similarly, the treaties set forth maximum
exceptions: signatory countries may restrict the scope of protection, to the extent
permitted by the treaties, but signatories are not obliged to impose all (or any) of
63

Compare Berne Conv. Arts. 10 (certain exceptions), 10bis (certain exceptions), 11
(certain public performance rights), 11bis (broadcasting rights), 11ter (certain public
performance rights) with TRIPs art. 13 (exceptions); WCT arts. 8 (right of communication to
the public); 10 (exceptions and limitations).
64

See TRIPs, art. 9.1.

65

See TRIPs, art. 64 (dispute settlement). The U.S. is currently the target of a dispute
resolution proceeding brought by the European Union regarding 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B), which
exempts certain commercial establishments from liability for public performances by means of
performing works by radio and television, WT/DS160/1-IP/D/16, filed January 26, 1999. Art.
33 of the Berne Convention provides for intergovernmental resort to the International Court
of Justice, should one country of the Union object to another’s interpretation or application
of the Convention’s provision, but Art. 33 also permits a union me mber, upon ratifying to
“declare that it does not consider itself bound” by that provision. 22 of the 140 Berne Union
members have reserved on art. 33. See <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/e-berne.htm >(visited
Sept. 29, 1999). It appears that no ICJ proceeding has been brought pursuant to art. 33. See
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm> (visited Sept. 29, 1999).
66

See TRIPs, art. 6; WCT, art. 6.2.

67

See TRIPs, art. 3; Berne Conv., art. 19.
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the limitations that the treaties authorize. This means that multilateral instruments
set a floor, but no ceiling, for the scope of copyright protection. National
copyright laws thus retain a role to set the upper limits of copyright, by affording
greater rights, or by selecting which permitted exceptions to impose.
2. EU Directives
The European Union, however, by imposing certain restrictions on the
scope of copyright, and by giving greater detail to permitted exceptions, has
constricted the role of national law to vary the height of the ceiling, as we have
already seen. 68 On the other had, if the mandatory exceptions ensure that
member States must impose a ceiling on copyright, member States nonetheless
may further drop the ceiling by adopting some or all of the various Directives’
authorized (as opposed to obligatory) exceptions. For example, one E.U.
member State may exempt certain uses of works on behalf of the visually- or
hearing-impaired (subject to “equitable compensation”), as authorized by art.
5.3(b) of the Draft Information Society Directive, while another may choose not
to limit copyright in that way. Thus, exceptions to copyright remain an area of
potential, albeit tempered, disparity within the E.U.
Regarding the rights protected, the Duration Directive specifies that it
does not purport to harmonize moral rights; none of the other Directives touch
moral rights, either.69 Thus, the content, as well as the duration, of rights of
attribution, and particularly of integrity, may vary considerably among the fifteen
member States.
But the principal gaps in the E.U. regime concern authorship and
ownership. The Directives continue to tolerate divergent national laws governing
authorship status, initial rights ownership, and presumptions of transfer. With
respect to authorship status, for example, the Software Directive and the
Database Directive leave to national law the determination of whether the
“author” may be a juridical, as well as a natural, person.70 Those Directives, as
well as the Duration Directive, refer to joint works and to collective works, but
do not define these terms.71 Indeed, the Rental Right Directive and the Satellite
Directive explicitly permit member States to designate who, in addition to the
68

See discussion supra , text at notes 47-53.

69

See Duration Directive, art. 9; Recital 21.

70

See Software Directive, art. 2.1; Database Directive, art. 4.1.

71

See Software Directive, art. 2.1; Database Directive, art. 4.2; Duration Directive, arts.

1.2, 1.4.
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principal director, shall be considered a co-author of an audiovisual work.72
Different national laws may supply differing definitions, not only of who is a coauthor, but of the category of joint works. For example, are “joint works” only
those in which the contributions are inseparable, or may they also be discrete, but
interdependent, as are the music and lyrics comprising a song?73 It seems that the
Directives deliberately avoid more precise definition of joint works. Indeed, the
Duration Directive appears to want it both ways: art. 1.4 provides that either the
duration for a single authored work, or the duration for a work of joint authorship
shall apply to “identified authors whose identified contributions are included in
[collective] works.” (Emphasis supplied)74 To be “identified,” the “contributions”
would be interdependent, rather than inseparable; the Directive thus leaves it to
national law to determine whether such contributions should be considered
individual or joint works.
With respect to initial rights ownership, the Software, Duration, and
Database Directives allow those member countries that vest initial ownership in
collective works (a term the Directives do not define) in juridical persons, to
continue to do so.75
With respect to presumptions of transfer, the Rental Right Directive
permits member States to provide for presumptions of transfer of rental rights
from authors to the film producer.76 The Directives do not require revision of
national laws setting forth other presumptions of transfer from authors to film
producers, producers of collective works, or other employers or commissioning
parties.
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See Rental Right Directive, art. 2.2; Satellite Directive, art. 1.5..
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Compare. Federal Republic of Germany, Copyright Law of 1965 (as amended), art.
8.1 (joint works are those whose “respective contributions cannot be separately identified”);
U.K., 1988 Copyright Designs and Patents Act, art. 10(1) (“contribution of each author is not
distinct from that of the other author or authors”) with Belgium, Copyright Law of June 30,
1994, art. 5.1 (joint works contributions may be “individualized”); France, Code of Intellectual
Property, art. L-113-2.1 (joint work is “a work in the creation of which more than one natural
person has participated”).
74

See Duration Directive, art. 1.1 (single authored work’s duration), 1.2 (joint work’s
duration), 1.4 (collective work’s duration).
75

See Software Directive, art. 1.2, Duration Directive, art. 1.4; Database Directive, art.

4.1.
76

See Rental Right Directive, art. 1.6.
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B. Choice of law: manipulating the applicable national norm
Choice of law strategies become increasingly important as copyright
disputes range over multiple territories. Within those disputes, manipulation of
legislative competence relies on the persistence of national copyright norms, but
seeks to make one country’s norms prevail over competing national norms.
1. Contractual clauses
Choice of law and of forum clauses offer a primary means of sidestepping
the potentially applicable norms of other countries (subject to exceptions such as
ordre public). Choice of law clauses can be especially relevant to resolution of
disputes concerning copyright ownership when the work involves the participation
of multiple authors from many different countries. Similarly, choice of law clauses
may simplify issues concerning the scope of a grant of multiterritorial rights under
copyright.
Choice of forum clauses are also important. The choice of the forum does
not, by itself, determine the applicable law.77 But, because each forum applies its
own conflict rules to characterize the nature of the claim and to designate the
choice of law rule that applies to that kind of claim, forum selection can favor
some laws over others. For example, some fora may consider some features of
the national copyright law, such as moral rights, to be mandatory even in
international situations;78 choosing a forum that does not impose its own laws as
laws of immediate application (or “lois de police”) can amount to avoiding a
specific set of mandatory national rules regarding copyright.
Similarly, with respect to the forum’s characterization of claims, in disputes
between authors or copyright owners and their grantees, some fora may
characterize the dispute as one involving contract law, while others might
characterize the controversy as a matter of substantive copyright law. For
example, in the U.S. the scope of a grant of copyright law is considered a contract
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Choosing a forum in State A does not necessarily mean that A’s law will apply. The
international private law rules of the forum will determine the applicable law.
78

See, e.g., France, Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. Civ. 1re, JCP II 21731, not e
Françon (foreign authors enjoy moral rights in France, regardless of whether authors enjoyed
or waived moral rights in the work’s country of origin).
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law question,79 while in Germany it is a matter of substantive copyright law.80 Or,
in Brazil, the contract governs the duration of a grant effected by a Brazilian author
under Brazilian law, but in the U.S., U.S. copyright rules determine whether the
Brazilian author’s grant of the second term of U.S. copyright (for works first
published while the 1909 Act was still in force) was properly effected.81 By
choosing a forum that characterizes the dispute as one in contract, the parties may
avoid national copyright regulation.
Substantive copyright issues other than ownership may not as easily be
resolved by contractual manipulation of the forum or applicable law. Notably, it is
not clear that a court will apply the law of the contract to determine whether the
work is copyrightable. Suppose, for example, that I produce a CD ROM of
digitized photographic images of public domain paintings. The contracts under
which I license reproduction rights are subject to U.K. law, whose “skill and
labour” originality standard these images would meet. By contrast, suppose that
the images lack the requisite minimum of creativity to qualify for U.S. copyright.82
Suppose further that my U.S. licensee distributes copies of the images in the U.S.
in excess of the terms of the license. If I bring a copyright infringement suit in the
U.S., will the court apply U.K. law to determine the images’ copyrightability? Or
will the court conclude that, since the alleged infringement is occurring in the U.S.,
only U.S. law is competent to govern the questions whether the work is
protectable and has been infringed?83
U.S. courts have not addressed the question whether parties to a contract
may opt out of territoriality, and into one particular municipal copyright law to
govern non contractual issues,84 although they have generally considered
copyrightability and infringement issues to be especially territorial. For example, in
Computer Associates v. Altai85, The Second Circuit declined to enjoin
79

See, e.g., Bartsch v. MGM , 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
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See German copyright law, art. 31; Michael Walter, La liberté contractuelle dans
le domaine du droit d’auteur et des conflits de lois, 87 RIDA 45, 71-83 (1976).
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See Corcovado v. Hollis Music, 981 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993).
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See supra note 39. This hypothetical is based on Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v.
Corel Corp., 36 F.Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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See Bridgeman Art, supra ; Itar Tass v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Cf. Turtur v. Rothschild Registry Int’l., 26 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1994); Nedlloyd Lines
BV v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992) (both assuming that parties to
the contract may submit contract-related tort claims to the law chosen to govern the contract).
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126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Computer Associates from pursuing its appeal in a French copyright action against
Altai, on the ground that the French action addressed an alleged violation of
French copyright law, while the U.S. action concerned an alleged violation of U.S.
copyright law, and Altai did not show that the standards for copyrightability of
computer software were “identical” under French and U.S. law. Because the
French claim was distinct from the U.S. claim (even if both arose out of alleged
reproduction of part of the CA operating system), the French judgment could not
have preclusive effect in the U.S.
Finally, choice of forum or of law clauses cannot select or avoid national
copyright norms when the dispute concerns parties not in privity with each other
(or when the parties have failed to effect a contractual choice of forum or of law).
On the other hand, principles of private international law may similarly result in
favoring some national norms over others, at least when the relevant principle
designates a single applicable national law in lieu of several national norms.
2. Principles of private international law
Conflict of laws rules can temper the territorial application of national
legislation. That is, unless the choice of law rule requires that local law always
apply to all aspects of a copyright dispute litigated in the local courts, then choice
of law rules may lead local courts to apply a foreign country’s law, even with
respect to persons or acts that have some connection with the local territory. In
this case, the court is not substituting an international norm for the forum’s
domestic law, but the court’s resort to another country’s domestic law nonetheless
ousts the forum’s own norm (and may well also exclude the application of other
national laws).
Copyright ownership is a particularly important area for choice of law,
since the applicable rule will determine whether copyright ownership will vary with
each national territory on which the work is exploited,86or instead will remain
constant, whatever the territory of exploitation. A conflicts rule that designates the
law of the work’s country of origin (or country with which the work has the “most
significant relationship”87) will mean that, for the forum that hears the claim, the
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Favoring such a rule, see, e.g., A NDRÉ LUCAS , A SPECTS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

PRIVÉ DE LA PROTECTION D’OEUVRES ET D’OBJETS DE DROITS CONNEXES TRANSMIS PAR RÉSEAUX
NUMÉRIQUES MONDIAUX,

http://www.wipo.org/fre/main.htm doc. no. GCPIC/1 (visited Oct. 4,
1999); JEAN-SYLVESTRE BERGÉ, LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE ET COMMUNAUTAIRE DU DROIT
D’AUTEUR : ESSAIE D’UNE ANALYSE CONFLICTUELLE 320-22 (1996).
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See, e.g., Itar-Tass v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998)(in action alleging
infringement in U.S, U.S. court applied Russian law to determine initial ownership of copyright
in work first published in Russia, by a Russian publisher, and written by Russian authors).
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copyright owner will be the same both at home, and abroad.88 But copyright
ownership will not achieve complete transnational consistency unless all fora
subscribe to the same conflicts rule. If one forum applies the law of the country of
the “most significant relationship” while another applies the law of the country of
exploitation, then we will continue to encounter variance in ownership status.
In the context of international copyright infringement actions, particularly
those involving digital media, some commentators have favored application of the
law of the point from which the infringement becomes available to the public, to the
full, multi-territorial, extent of the claim.89 This approach substitutes a single
national law for a plethora of potentially applicable laws, and thus simplifies the
action, while still maintaining a territorial nexus to the country from which the root
act occurred. Other commentators have favored the law of the countries where the
infringement occurs. This highly territorial approach preserves a maximum role for
national norms.90
Another approach to choice of law for multinational copyright infringement
claims would nominally apply the rule of territoriality, but, at least where all
relevant countries are Berne Union or WTO members, would presume that all
affected territories adhere to Berne-TRIPs minima. Since the forum under these
circumstances would also be a Berne-WTO country, the court might further
presume that all the relevant countries’ laws are like the forum’s.91 The court
would then apply its own law to the full extent of the claim, subject to a showing
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The same result might be achieved through resort to a different point of attachment,
for example, country of first publication. But that country may not always be easy to identify,
especially if first publication occurs over the Internet. See JANE C. GINSBURG, T HE PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN AN ERA OF T ECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 1998 RECUEIL DES
COURS DE L’A CADÉMIE I NTERNATIONALE DE LA HAYE PART 273, 239-405 (1999) [hereinafter
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publication).
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See generally, id. Chapter 3 (discussing theories and cases).
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See, e.g., LUCAS , supra note 86 (laws of each country of receipt should apply to
multinational copyright infringement committed over digital networks).
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Se e , e.g., Louknitsky v. Louknitsky, 266 P.2d 910 (1954)(presuming similarity of
Chinese marital property law to California’s); Leary v. Gledhill, 84 A.2d 725 (1951). But cf.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (declining to apply Kansas law when that
law conflicted with that of other jurisdictions, and Kansas had little connection to either the
class action plaintiffs or the suit's subject matter); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 740-44 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying multistate class action because the district court failed
adequately to analyze possible variations in state law).
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that in certain countries, local norms are either more or less protective than the
forum’s.92
This survey has shown that national copyright laws retain some vitality,
particularly regarding copyright ownership, and, to a lesser extent, copyright
exceptions. But this does not mean that all national norms will apply all the time in
multinational settings. Legislative competence over copyright disputes may in fact
be narrowed by contract or by choice of law principles.

III. What Role Should Remain For National Copyright Law in an Era of
International Norms?
International uniformity of substantive norms favors the international
dissemination of works of authorship. If the goal is to foster the world-widest
possible audience for authors in the digital age, then one might conclude that
national copyright norms are vestiges of the soon-to-be bygone analog world. But
not all copyright exploitations occur over digital networks, and, more importantly,
national laws remain relevant, even for the Internet.
Two principal areas for national preservation are copyright ownership and
exceptions. The interplay of these national norms with choice of law rules,
however, may differ. In the case of allocation of ownership rights, the multilateral
treaties’ and E.U. Directives’ deference to national law in matters of copyright
ownership indicates that national norms regarding employment or commissioned
work relations should prevail. But should they prevail within each territory on
which the work is exploited, or should the norm in the territory of the State with
the most significant relationship to the work (usually, the country of origin) also
govern in other countries in which the work is exploited? The management of
rights under copyright might be simplified if choice of law rules designated a single
applicable law, that of the country with the most significant relationship to the
work’s creation. 93 In that case, copyright ownership would remain constant
across national borders, thus facilitating licensing.94 In support of such a choice of
law rule, one might contend that countries with less significant relationships to the
work’s creation rarely have an interest in contravening employer-employee (or
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See generally GINSBURG, HAGUE LECTURES , 336-38.
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This is usually the country of origin, but it could also be the one whose law is
designated in the employment or commissioned work contract.
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See discussion supra , text at and notes 86-88.
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commissioned work) relationships among foreign parties. On the other hand, one
might also observe that local laws’ allocation of copyright ownership defines labor
relations in the country of exploitation, and that recognition of another country’s
less author-favorable ownership allocations with respect to foreign authors may
result in an unfair competitive advantage against local authors, at least if local law
makes local authors more expensive to deal with. Arguably, these concerns could
find expression in application of the ordre public exception, leaving as the default
rule the application of the law of the country with the most significant relationship
to the work. In that case, with respect to ownership of the economic rights under
copyright, national norms that implement the country of most significant
relationship’s policies about labor markets would continue to play an important
role not only within that country’s borders, but outside as well.95
What approach should one follow when the issue concerns not ownership
of economic rights, but assertion of moral rights? Here, the multilateral instruments
and institutions send mixed signals: the Berne Convention sets a substantive
minimum, that TRIPs does not enforce, and the E.U. has shied away from
harmonizing national standards.96 This certainly suggests that national norms may
95

A different analysis may be warranted when the compensation issue turns not on
copyright ownership, but authorship status, cf. discussion of moral rights, infra . For example,
the European Rental Rights Directive, Council Directive 92/100/EEC, O.J.E.C. No. L 346/61, art.
4.1, provides authors and performers an inalienable right to “equitable remu n e r a t i o n ” f o r
rentals of phonograms and copies of audiovisual works. Thus, no matter who owns the
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continue to differ, but, as with economic rights, does not tell us whether each
norm should apply territorially, or whether the national norms of the country with
the most significant relationship to the work’s creation and initial dissemination also
apply abroad. Two features of moral rights point towards discrete territorial
application of local protections. First, the interests that moral rights secure are
supposed to be “personal” to the author, for, in the terms of the Berne
Convention, they address the author’s “honor or reputation.”97 Arguably, the
relevant locus of the author’s honor or reputation (and, therefore, the competent
national norm) is the author’s residence or domicile, since that is where the author
subjectively experiences the harm.98 Nonetheless, “reputation” concerns how the
author is perceived in other people’s eyes. Harm to reputation is proved not by
showing that the complainant was distressed by the alleged libel, but that others
did or were likely to believe the libel, and accordingly treat the complainant the
worse for it.99 In some countries, authors may be more (or less) honored than in
others; an alleged moral rights violation differently affects their local reputations.
Second, moral rights are not just personal to authors, they express national
cultural policy concerning the recognition of authorship and the maintenance of the
integrity of works. The more a country respects, not to say reveres, authorship,
the more willing it is (at least in theory) to tolerate authors’ disruption of the local
commercial market for the work, by allowing authors to seek legal redress against
its exploiters. This tolerance, however, should only extend to the local market. It
follows for both of these reasons that the availability of a moral rights claim, and its
assessment on the merits, should be determined by each country for its own
territory.
Regarding exceptions to copyright, a strong case may also be made for
application of each country’s laws on its own territory. While international
instruments impose a general framework, they preserve some national autonomy
regarding the content (and, outside the E.U., the form) of copyright exceptions.
Thus, the flexible (perhaps unpredictable) U.S. fair use exception may co-exist
with a more rigid continental-style closed list of specific exemptions and
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See, e . g . Pierre Bourel, Du rattachement de quelques délits spéciaux en droit
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limitations.100 Arguably, the multilateral instruments’ tolerance of substantive
diversity says nothing about whether a single national norm limiting copyright
should apply (for example, the law of the country from which the work is made
available to the public, particularly via digital communications), or whether each
country of receipt should apply its own norms regarding exceptions and limitations.
Several considerations nonetheless point toward discrete territorial application of
local norms limiting copyright, even for digital transmissions.
National legislatures establish copyright exceptions for the benefit of local
users. This is particularly true of the “pork barrel” and “subsidy” kinds of
limitations.101 For example, the U.S. may wish (perhaps in contravention of its
TRIPs obligations) to exempt small businesses and restaurants from paying
performance rights royalties for radio and television performances;102 there is no
reason that this solicitude should benefit restaurants outside the U.S. Or the
German federal legislature may compel authors to subsidize German schools by
subjecting works used in school anthologies to compulsory licensing;103 there is no
reason this subsidy should extend to schools outside Germany, in countries that
lack similar provisions.
Even with respect to free speech-motivated exceptions, such as criticism,
commentary and parody, in the absence of greater international harmonization,
local norms should determine how much free or price-controlled use the exception
permits. For example, the Draft Information Society Directive permits quotation
for purposes of criticism or review, if the use is “in accordance with fair practice,
and to the extent required by the specific purpose.”104 Fair practice according to
each member State’s norms? According to a harmonized E.U. norm? National
norms of fairness may differ: for example, the revue de presse may be a tradition
in some countries, but not in others.105 It is not obvious that an extensive revue de
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presse exception in the country from which the work is made available to the
public should apply in countries of receipt that lack such an exception.
If the country of a digital communication’s origin should not extrude its
copyright exceptions to countries of receipt, what about the reverse proposition?
Should countries of receipt apply their own exceptions, regardless of the law of the
country of departure? Suppose for example, that a U.S. party made available
over a digital network (and U.S.-based server) a parody whose copying exceeded
U.S. fair use bounds, but was consonant with French practice. Should France
apply its exception to parodies received in France? Outside the context of digital
communications, for example, were the parody of a U.S. work created or
exploited by analog media in France, principles of national treatment would subject
the U.S. work to the same copyright limitations as French works incur. While
simplicity, and ease of international commerce, counsel against the same result
when a work is simultaneously made available in innumerable countries via the
Internet, logical consistency would retain the application of the national norm.
Moreover, the norm is an expression of the receiving country’s cultural and
information policy, manifested here by a choice to enhance its residents’ exposure
to certain kinds of works based on or incorporating portions of copyrighted works
(e.g., parody). To the extent that the receiving country can apply its norm, without
foisting that norm on other countries, it should be able to do so.
Conclusion
“International copyright” can no longer accurately be described as a
“bundle” consisting of many separate sticks, each representing a distinct national
law, tied together by a thin ribbon of Berne Convention supranational norms.
Today’s international copyright more closely resembles a giant squid, whose many
national law tentacles emanate from but depend on a large common body of
international norms. In the meantime, while international norms continue to
constrain, if not supercede, national copyright laws, some national norms remain
significant. Sometimes national norms persist by designed deference to local labor
and cultural policies, as seems to be the case with copyright ownership, and may
be the case with exceptions and limitations on copyright. Sometimes, however,
national norms endure from a failure of the political will of the drafters of
multilateral instruments, as may also be the case with exceptions and limitations on
copyright.
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